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Intellectual property issues in
•
genom1cs
Rebecca S. Eisenberg--- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - -- - - Controversy over intellectual property rights in the results of large-scale cDNA
sequencing raises intriguing questions about the roles of the public and private
sectors in genomics research, and about who stands to benefit (and who stands to
lose) from the private appropriation of genomic information. While the US Patent
and Trademark Office has rejected patent applications on cDNA fragments of
unknown function from the National Institutes of Health, private firms have pursued
three distinct strategies for exploiting unpatented cDNA sequence information:
exclusive licensing, non-exclusive licensing and dedication to the public domain.

Intellectual property issues have been unusually conspicuous in the recent history ofadvances in genomics,
even by the standards of the patent-weary genetics and
molecular biology communities. Controversy has been
particularly acute over intellectual property rights in
the results of large-scale human cDNA sequencing.
Beginning in 1991 with the fiJing of patent applications by the National Institutes of Heakh (NIH) on
R. S. Eisenberg (rse@umic/1.ed11) is at the University ofMid1igo11 !.Aw
School, H11td1i11s Hall, 625 South. State Street, Ann Arbor, Ml
48109, USA.
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the first batch of expressed sequence tags {ESTs) from
the laboratory of Craig Venter 1, each new development has been met with lively speculation about its
strategic significance from an intellectual property perspective. Are cDNA. fragments of unknown function
patentable, or is further research or characterization
necessary before they satisfy standards of patent law2- 9?
Will patents on such fragments promote commercial
investment jn product dcvelopment}.6, or will they
interfere with scientific communication and collaboration, and retard the overaU research effort5 .7·9? Jn the
absence of patent rights, how may the owners of
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private cDNA-sequence databases earn a return on
their investment, while still permitting other investigators to obtain access to the information on reasonable
terms8,10-12? What are the rights of those who contribute
resources, such as cDNA libraries, that are used to create the databases 13•14 , and what are the rights of those
who identify sequences of interest out of the mass of
information in the databases by formulating appropriate
querieslS? Will the disclosure of ESTs in the public
domain preclude patenting of subsequently characterized full-length genes and gene products3? And why
would a conunercial firm invest its own resources in
generating an EST database for the public domain 16?
Two factors have contributed to the fascination with
intellectual property issues in genomics research. The
first is a perception that some pioneers in large-scale
cDNA-sequencing have sought to claim intellectual
property rights that reach far beyond their actual
achievements to cover the future discoveries of
others 17 · 18. For example, the controversial NIH patent
applications claimed not only the ESTs for which
sequences were actually set forth in the specifications,
but also the corresponding full-length cDNAs, as well
as smaller portions of those full-length cDNAs that
might not even include the disclosed ESTs (Re( 1).
More recently, private owners of cDNA-sequence
databases have made access to the databases conditional
upon agreement in advance to offer either a license or
a right of first refusal to any resulting intellectual property rights 1n-12. These efforts to appropriate discoveries
that have yet to be made by other researchers raise
issues about the fairness and efficiency of the intellectual property system in allocating rewards and incentives along the path of cumulative innovation. These
concerns arc particularly compelling to research scientists, who have more than just conunercial interests
at stake in disputes over claims to inventions 19 .
The second factor is the counterintuitive alignment
ofinterests in the debate 20·21 • It was a public institution,
the NIH, that initially took an aggressive position in
favor of patenting discoveries that some representatives
of industry thought were unpatentable and should
remain unpatented, and it was a major pharmaceutical firm, Merck & Co., that ultimately took upon itself
the quasi-governmental function of sponsoring a university-based effort to place comparable information
in the public domain 16 • These topsy-turvy positions in
the public and private sectors raise intriguing questions
about the proper roles of government and industry in
genomics research, and about who stands to benefit
(and who stands to lose) from the private appropriation of genomic information22,

Promoting R&D through exclusive rights
Research scientists in public institutions are often
troubled by the concept of intellectual property,
because they believe that science will advance most
rapidly ifsubsequent researchers enjoy free access to prior
knowledge. By contrast, the law of intellectual property rests on an assumption that, without exclusive rights,
there will be too little investment in R&D (Ref. 23).

In a commercial setting, a standard argument for
intellectual property is that inventions are costly to
make in the first place, but cheap and easy to copy once
someone else has made them. Firms will, therefore,
have very little incentive to invest in research and
development unless they have some means of preventing competitors from reaping the benefits of their
investment without sharing in the initial risk and cost.
One way of excluding competitors is to keep inventions secret, but secrecy is not always feasible and may
be socially undesirable.
The patent system provides an alternative strategy
for protecting inventions without secrecy. A patent
provides the right to exclude others from making.
using and selling the invention for a limited term - in
most of the world, this is 20 years from the application
filing date24, 25. In order to get a patent, the inventor
must disclose the invention fully, so as to enable
others to make and use it26·27 • Within the realm of
industrial research, it is plausible that the patent system promotes more disclosure than would occur if
secrecy were the only available strategy for excluding
competitors from using the discovery. This is less clear
in the case of research in the public sector, which is
typically published with or without patent protection.
The argument for patenting inventions made in the
public sector is a variation on the standard justification
for patents in the commercial setting, with emphasis
on the post-invention costs and risks involved in
taking a new invention out of the laboratory and
developing it into a successful commercial product,
rather than the pre-invention costs of making the
invention in the first place20•21 . The argument is that
the cost of post-invention development typically far
exceeds pre-invention research outlays, and firms will
be unwilling to make this substantial investment without protection from competition if the product proves
successful. Patents thus facilitate the transfer of technology to the private sector by providing exclusive rights
to preserve the profit incentives of innovating firms.

Public and private cDNA sequencing
Such an argument was advanced by the NIH while
it was pursuing patent rights in the first few thousand
ESTs identified by Venter and his colleagues328 . However, the response of the intended beneficiaries of the
NIH patents - the US biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries was less than enthusiastic, suggesting that there may be some limits to the logic of
promoting private appropriation of the result'> of publicly supported research 21 • Perhaps this was an example
of the sort of research discovery that might be more
eHectively exploited - even by industry- if left in the
public domain. Ultimately, those particular sequences
entered the public domain after the US Patent and
Trademark Office rejected the NIH patent claims29 .
The NIH did not continue to support the large-scale
cDNA-sequencing effort that Venter and his
colleagues had begun in the public sector. Instead,
Venter and his group turned down a grant from the
US Department of Energy and left the NIH in 1992
TIBTECH AUGUST 1996 (VOL 14)
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to form a non-profit research organization, The Institute for Genomic Research (TIGR; Rockville, MD,
USA), with more generous private-sector funding3°.
The same financial backers also formed a for-profit
company, Human Genome Sciences (HGS;
Rockville, MD, USA), to identify and develop commercial products from the sequence information that
TIGR developed3 1 • Both organizations were soon
engaged in a massive automated cDNA-sequencing
effort, creating two, large, privately held databases of
sequence information. Meanwhile, another private
firm, Incyte Pharmaceuticals (Palo Alto, CA, USA)
had also turned its attention to large-scale sequencing
of cDNA fragments, creating a competing private
database 32 .

Non-patent strategies for commercial
exploitation of sequence databases
Although the database owners are actively seeking
patent protection on their sequences, and have
obtained a few patents on sequences encoding identified peptides with disclosed function33-35, it remains to
be seen what, if any, patent rights they will ultimately
obtain in sequences for which they cannot yet provide
a comparable disclosure 36 . Meanwhile, they have been
able to exploit the databases commercially by controlling access to them, in effect, using contracts and trade
secrecy to protect their intellectual property.
The viability of contract and trade secrecy strategies
for the protection of sequence information may be
limited by Merck's entry into the field as sponsor of a
competing cDNA-sequencing effort at Washington
University (St Louis, MO, USA), the results of which
are made immediately available in the public
domain16,22 •37 . The commercial value of private databases is likely to decline as the information in the public domain increases; prospective licensees may hesitate to sign restrictive database-access agreements if
they expect to find comparable information available
in the near future on an unrestricted basis.
There are, however, differences in the information
available from the public and private sources; these differences, at least to date, leave the private database
owners with something to sell. How long this window of opportunity remains open will depend on
whether, and how quickly, comparable information
becomes available in the public domain, and on what
the private firms do in the interim to maintain their
advantage. Although the public-domain database is
growing rapidly38 , at this point, the private databases
are significantly larger-"9 . Owners of the private databases also claim to offer superior products in a number of respects: they have assembled contiguous fragments of cDNA into longer sequences; they provide
more-complete annotations for the sequences, including information about expression in different types of
tissue; and their sequence information comes with
high-powered bioinformatics capabilities and userfriendly software. Inasmuch as all the information that
enters the public database also promptly becomes available in the private databases, the public database can
TIBTECH AUGUST 1996 (VOL 14)

never be superior to the private databases. Nevertheless, the free availability of the public database enhances
the value of the sequences it includes as a resource for
discovery in certain respects. For example, sequences in
the public database are being mapped40 , and the mapping information is also promptly made available in the
public domain, enhancing the value of the public database sequences to positional cloners41.
The value of the public database could be limited by
the pending patent applications of private database
owners. If these applications ripen into issued patents,
they could subsequently pre-empt the use of any
sequences that they cover. even if those sequences were
publicly disclosed prior to issuance of the patents, as
long as the patent applicants are able to establish their
priority. Because US patent applications are maintained in confidence until a patent is issued42 , it is
impossible to determine, at this stage, what sequences
have been the subject of patent applications. Therefore, those who make use of sequences obtained from
the public database cannot be sure that the sequences
will remain in the public domain, and may face a
future injunction against continuing use of sequences
that are subsequently patented by HGS or lncyte on
the basis of previously filed patent applications. Of
course, the same uncertainty applies to sequences
obtained from the private databases - a sequence
obtained by a subscriber to the Incyte database might
turn out to be covered by a previously filed HGS
patent, for example. Because the Merck initiative got
off to a late start, its sequences are more likely to be
covered by prior patent applications of the other firms.

Exclusive licensing, non-exclusive licensing, and
the public domain
Meanwhile, in the absence of issued patents for all
but a few of their sequences, the owners of private
databases may be able to convert their current control
over access to databases into a valuable proprietary
position in subsequent future research discoveries. The
actions ofHGS, Incyte and Merck show three distinct
strategies for exploiting unpatented information:
exclusive licensing, non-exclusive licensing and
dedication to the public domain. As each of these
approaches comes from the private sector, we can
assume that each firm believes, rightly or wrongly, that
its strategy will maximize the value it obtains from the
information. The strategies are quite different, but
they are interdependent, and it is still too early to tell
how each will pay off. However, we can see how
different firms are placing their bets, and we also have
some idea of the size of those bet~.

Exclusive licensing
HGS has sold a three-year exclusive right of access
to its database to SmithKline Beecham (SB) in exchange for US$125 million, to be made in payments over
a three-year period, plus royalties on product sa1es31 ,43 .
The agreement gives SB a 'right of first refusal' to
develop and market protein therapeutic and diagnostic products using the information in the database,
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but it does not cover gene therapy or antisense
products HGS has entered into separate collaborative agreements with other research partners for the
development of products in these areas44. During the
three-year period ofSB's license, investigators in academic and non-profit institutions may obtain access to
portions of the database if they and their institutions
sign a Database Access Agreement45.46 or a Material
Transfer Agreement 10.47 • The terms of these agreements vary depending on whether the sequence was
identified at TIGR or HGS, and whether it has a
counterpart in a public database. Access to HGS
sequences that have not yet been disclosed or have
been partially disclosed in a public database is permitted only to those who sign a Material Transfer
Agreement granting 'a sole and exclusive worldwide
right and license' to HGS to develop any resulting
products on terms to be negotiated in the future 47 .
Academic investigators may obtain access to TIGR
sequences that have not yet been disclosed in a public
database if their institutions sign a Database Option
Agreement granting HGS 'a sole and exclusive option
to obtain a sole and exclusive or a non-exclusive
worldwide royalty bearing license' to resulting products+ 1A2. Sequences that have been disclosed or
partially disclosed in a public database are available on
less-restricted terms, but even for these sequences,
investigators are limited to a specified number of
queries that may be recorded, stored and monitored
by the Database Manager1 6 • No outside investigators
may trawl through the database or manipulate its contents at will, and commercial investigators may not
obtain access to the database at all.
An obvious advantage of this exclusive-licensing
strategy, at least from the perspective ofHGS, is that it
has generated a lot of revenue. SB placed a very large
bet, but we don't yet know how it will pay off. An
obvious concern with the exclusive-licensing approach is that restricting access to the database to such
a degree may limit the value that is extracted from the
information during the term of the exclusive license.
Indeed, as the term ofSB's exclusive license under the
original agreement comes to an end, HGS and SB
appear to be departing from their original exclusive
licensing strategy in favor of allowing more firms to
tap into the database. Within the past year, HGS and
SB have entered into collaborative agreements (or, in
one case, signed a letter of intent to enter into such an
agreement) to allow four additional pharmaceutical
firms [Takeda Chemical Industries+8 , Merck KGaA
(not related to Merck & Co.) 49, Schering Plough and
Synthelabo SA (Re£ 59)] to share access to the database, evaluate the information and develop related
products. These new collaborators will make total payments of at least US$140 million to H GS and SB over
a five-year period, not including milestone payments
and royalties. In addition to bringing in new revenue,
it is likely that these new agreements will increase the
amount that is learned from the database by expanding the universe of investigators who are able to make
queries.

Non-exclusive licensing
lncvte has offered non-exclusive licenses, at a consider;bly cheaper price, to as many firms as will take
them, with eight firms having signed up as database
subscribers to date. Upjohn (now Pharmacia &
Upjohn) and Pfizer have each signed non-exclusive
agreements with Incyte, involving payments in the
region of US$20-25 million, including amounts for
the purchase oflncyte stock, plus royalties on product
saless0 ; Novo Nordisk and Hoechst have signed similar agreements on undisclosed financial terms 51 • 5 ~; and
Abbott Laboratories subsequently signed an agreement that Incyte characterized in a press release as 'the
largest financial commitment by a subscriber to date',
although these terms include payment for sequencing
microbial genomes53. When Incyte announced its
sixth subscriber, Johmon & Johnson, the accompanying press release claimed that the six subscribers >vill
pay a minimum combined total of US$100 million,
excluding contingent payments such as milestones and
product royalties 54 . Since that announcement, Incyte
has entered into additional agreements vv1.th HoffinannLa Rochess and Zeneca 56 • Incyte's subscribers have
placed smaller individual bets than SB did but, in the
long run, there could be quite a number of subscribers.
Although the HGS strategy initially appeared to
generate more revenue for the database owner, Incyte's
strategy may yet prove to be more lucrative. One might
expect that Incyte's window of opportunity for signing up new subscribers would be closing as the Mercksponsored sequencing effort at Washington University
expands the competing public database; however, all
but the first oflncyte's subscribers have signed up since
Merck announced its competing effort.
From a broader social standpoint, the size of the ultimate payoffs is more interesting than the size of the
bets placed. Which approach will yield more discoveries or commercial products? Although the nonexclusive strategy seems more likely to take advantage
of the different capabilities ofdifferent commercial firms,
a drawback of the Incyte approach is that the company
has not yet figured out how to make its database available to academic investigators without undermining its
value to corporate subscribers. At present, academic
investigators may only obtain access to the database by
collaborating with one oflncyte's subscribers.
Public domain
The Merck strategy of putting sequence information
in the public domain is the newest approach and, at
least at first glance, the most puzzling. How does this
strategy advance Merck's own interests? By putting the
information in the public domain, Merck can generate the information more cheaply indeed, almost
unbelievably cheaply. Merck is placing a very small bet,
somewhere under US$10 million57; this is a fraction
of the amounts spent by Pfizer and Upjohn for their
non-exclusive deals with lncyte, and a tiny fraction of
the amount spent by SB for its exclusive deal with HGS.
By positioning itself as a public benefactor, Merck
is able to take advantage of existing infrastructure
TIBTECH AUGUST 1996 (VOL 14)
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at Washington University, previously put in place with
public funds, for use in its sequencing effort. Merck
has also been able to obtain other inputs at nominal
cost that it would have had to pay a premium for if it
were trying to assemble a private databaseB.
Apart from generating the sequence information
more cheaply, Merck claims that it expects to derive
more benefit from the information by distributing it
widely58 . As Merck sees it, the sequence information
will not yield products for commercial development
until further fundamental research is done to elucidate
the functions and biological pathways associated with
the partially sequenced genes. Merck's comparative
advantage does not lie in performing this fundamental research, but rather in developing specific drugs at
a later stage in the R&D process. Nothing compels
researchers who use the database to bring any potential products to Merck for commercial development,
but Merck is confident that its capabilities and
resources will allow it to capture an adequate share of
resulting products to justify its modest investment in
generating the database.
Some observers have suggested a more cynical motivation: that Merck seeks to undermine the value of
investments already made in existing sequence databases by its commercial competitors 58 • Putting the
information in a public database leaves HGS and
Incyte (and their collaborators) dependent on patent
rights to protect their proprietary positions in the long
run, and Merck may be betting that they won't obtain
much in the way of patent rights.
The Merck data may enhance the value of existing
databases as a resource for discovery, but it plainly
undermines the value of the databases as intellectual
property, at least to the extent that they are unprotected by patent rights. This distinction highlights the
very different ways in which the sequence information
is valued by Merck on the one hand, and HGS and
Incyte on the other. From Merck's perspective, cDNA
sequences are research tools for use in drug discovery,
not products for sale to consumers. For HGS and
Incyte, cDNA sequences are, themselves, an immediate source of revenue.
Merck's own strategy for making money does not
rely on maintaining a proprietary position in cDNA
sequences, so it has little to lose, and possibly something to gain, by putting such sequences in the public
domain. Merck does not have any therapeutic protein
or DNA diagnostic products that might require proprietary rights in DNA sequences to be commercially
viable. Far more important to Merck's commercial
position are its proprietary rights in the small molecules that it hopes to develop and sell as pharmaceutical products.
Apart from the question of whether Merck makes
any money out of the sequence information that goes
into the public domain, it will be interesting to see
how other firms and publicly funded investigators put
this information to use. Will the non-proprietary
character of the information lead commercial firms to
shun the data for tear of being unable to exclude comTIBTECH AUGUST 1996 (VOL 14J

petitors from the market for any resulting products, or
will the public database be actively and widely
exploited? Preliminary indications suggest that as the
data come on line they are raising considerable interest, with accessions to GenBank showing a dramatic
increase.3 8 • A large part of this increase has come in the
form of anonymous file transfer protocol (ftp) downloads of the entire database, a form of query that is likely
to be popular with commercial users who do not want
to risk showing their hands to competitors by leaving
an electronic record of what it is they are looking for.

Public versus private
These three different approaches highlight striking
differences in the interests of different companies in
proprietary rights in the human genome: HGS and
Incyte may benefit from a strategy that promotes the
private appropriation of DNA sequences, whereas
Merck may benefit from a strategy that puts these
sequences in the public domain. One firm's research
tool may be another firm's end product. However, in
an important sense, the fact that Merck chooses to put
cDNA sequences in the public domain is more
instructive than the fact that HGS and Incyte choose
to appropriate them as private property. Whenever
new property rights come into view, someone will step
forward to claim them, and it is unsurprising to hear
the claimants assert that private ownership will
enhance the public welfare. It is far more uncommon
for a private firm to disclaim proprietary rights in the
information it generates and to sing the praises of the
public domain.
The Merck initiative raises fundamental questions
about the boundaries between public and private in
research science and product development. Previously,
one could give a coherent account of these boundaries
in theory, however blurred they may have been in
practice: public research tended to focus on the pursuit of fundamental knowledge that was not readily
appropriable by a private owner, and that would have
the greatest social value ifit was widely distributed \vith
no restrictions on its use; by contrast, private research
tended to focus on narrower applications of scientific
principles that were readily appropriable by innovating firms, and these firms required proprietary rights
to make their investments in R&D profitable. Publicly
supported research was presumptively placed in the
public domain, while privately supported research was
typically appropriated as intellectual property.
These boundaries are now more difficult to maintain,
particularly in fields of such obvious commercial interest as genomics. Researchers in the public and private
sectors are often working on the same problems,
whether competitively or collaboratively, and the prevailing wisdom is that institutions performing publicly
sponsored research should patent their discoveries to
promote commercial development. In this environment, we lack a clear strategy about when it makes
sense for the public to sponsor research, and when it
makes sense to dedicate new knowledge to the public
domain.
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When public policy promotes the private appropriation of research results as intellectual property, even
when they emerge from public sector research, it is
easy to lose sight of the public and private benefits of
disseminating information in the public domain. The
most obvious of these benefits is that free availability
encourages widespread use of information and minimizes transaction costs. Travel on a freeway is both
cheaper and faster than travel on a route 'With numerous tollbooths. Similarly, R&D is cheaper and faster if
it uses resources that are freely available than it is if the
road to product development requires frequent stops
to negotiate licenses for access to prior discoveries.
Free roadways can also enhance the value of private
property by making it more readily accessible. Thus,
free dissemination of information via the Internet
helps firms attract customers. A vigorous public
domain can supply a meeting place for people, information and ideas that might not come together in the
course of more organized, licensed encounters. For
fields of research that draw heavily upon work carried
out in the public sector and in academia, it is particularly relevant that information in the public domain is
accessible to relatively poorly funded users who would
otherwise be priced out of the market. Thus, for
example, if academic researchers are particularly important to the progress of research in a field, as Merck
evidently believes they are for understanding the human
genome, then the overall research enterprise could be
significantly retarded by property rights that restrict
their access to essential resources and information.
If, in fact, ESTs have more social value in the public domain than in the hands of private owners, perhaps government sponsors should have taken upon
themselves the burden ofsupplying this resource to the
public, rather than leaving it to the private sector. On
the other hand, perhaps the extent of private-sector
interest in supporting large-scale cDNA sequencing
indicates that this work does not require government
funding, and that public resources would be better
spent on other projects. The Merck initiative invites
the optimistic conclusion that there are limits to how
far the government can go wrong - that if the stakes
are high enough, someone in the private sector may
find it worthwhile to correct for any errors in judgement on the part of the government, and maybe even
to pick up the tab. It would, however, be foolish to
conclude on the basis of this extraordinary episode that
we can rely on the private sector to enrich the public
domain while public research institutions pursue
patent rights. Perhaps a better lesson to draw, is that
we may have underestimated the value, to the private
sector as well as to the public sector, of a rich public
domain, and that we may need to reconsider the
limits of private appropriation of new information as
a means of promoting commercial development.
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